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OVERHAULING THE GOOD FAITH
REASONABLE DOUBT TEST: UNIONS
SHOULD BE OBLIGATED TO PROVIDE
ANNUAL MANDATORY POLLS TO
DETERMINE CONTINUING UNION
MAJORITY STATUS
EvE T.

KRASZEWSKI*

INTRODUCTION

Labor unions have a renewed arrogant attitude, even though
membership rosters are continually dropping and the economy is
lagging.' Indeed, after recent victories in the latest high profile
strikes,' unions have become more fearless, more certain, and
more belligerent.3 These strikes reveal an emerging trend that
unions are more zealous in waging war against employers.4
However, as unions appear to be more actively protecting
employees from employer abuses today than in recent history,
unions today are also more prone to perpetrate abuses, including
embezzlement.'
For instance, union dues from some of the
lowest-earning union workers in the nation paid for a three million
dollar jet airplane used by the president of the Hotel Employees
and Restaurant Employees International Union, an armada of
Cadillacs for the union's directors, and a $100,000 motor home for
* Eve Kraszewski was a 1996 graduate of Roosevelt University and a
1999 graduate of the John Marshall Law School, where she was a member of
the Law Review. She was employed by the Des Plaines, Illinois law firm of
Samelson & Payne.
1. Steven Greenhouse, Unions, Growing Bolder, No Longer Shun Strikes,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1998, at A12; Frank Swoboda, A Matter of Organization,
WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1998, at D9.
2. Greenhouse, supra note 1, at A12. The president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.,
John J. Sweeney, declares that the escalation in labor strikes is caused by
greater labor assurance and its obstinate demeanor. Id.
3. Swoboda, supra note 1, at D9. The group of major strikes include
"United Parcel Service ... General Motors ... Bell Atlantic ... and Northwest
Airlines ....
Id.
4. Id. Union president John J. Sweeney contends that organized labor is
more active today than any time in recent history. Id.
5. Cam Simpson, High Life of Union's Top Brass Revealed, CHI. SUN
TIMES, Sept. 24, 1998, at Al.
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a union official. 6
Despite these abuses, the current law regulating employee
polling to determine whether a union still holds majority support
among employees still heavily favors labor unions' over
employers. 8 However, the scales may be tipping back toward the
employer as the good faith reasonable doubt test, which the
employer must demonstrate before polling its employees, has come
This Article
under fire recently from the Supreme Court.9
examines the different standards for union polling of employees
Part I explains the
and for employer polling of employees.
legislative history and purpose of the National Labor Relations
Act, which governs employee polling. Part I explores the failures
of the National Industrial Recovery Act as well as the passage of
the Wagner Act, and the Taft-Hartley Act, which amended the
Wagner Act. Part I also explains the concept of union and
employer polling and the good faith bargaining requirement,
which places too high a burden on employers.
Part II discusses the most recent developments and the labor
board's proposals regarding employer polling. Moreover, Part II
establishes that the Taft-Hartley Act provides different standards
for employee polling that favor unions over employers. Part II
argues that any determination of union majority status should be
made from the employers' and employees' perspective, rather than
the unions'. Finally, Part III proposes a uniform system regarding
employer and union polling, which includes less restrictions on
6. Id. On the list of purported abuses by then-union president Edward T.
Hanley Sr. and his son, Thomas W. Hanley, included the following:
embezzlement of union funds; leasing vehicles for more than $500,000 per
year which were used by senior bosses (who had no apparent duties), their
wives and family members; compensation to consultants who provided little or
no work, including payment to the son of an alleged top-ranking Chicago
mafioso and political boss. Id.
7. See Springfield Discount, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 921, 921-23 (1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2173 (7th Cir. 1973) (explaining that the
Labor Board is within its discretion to apply different standards when a union
polls the employees prior to an election).
8. Louis-Allis Co. v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 1972). The court
held that an "employer occupies a far different position with regard to the
coercive impact of its action upon employees than does a Union." Id. "The
[Labor] Board, recognizing this difference, has frequently applied different
standards to the actions of the employer than it has to similar actions of
unions." Id.
9. Bernard Mower, NLRB: Supreme Court Probes Agency Policy Limiting
Polling of Workers on Union Support, 200 DLR AA-1 (1997). The Supreme
Court stated that "the [Bloard uses the term doubt to mean disbelief, rather
than uncertainty." Id. Skeptical of the test, Chief Justice William Rehnquist
"declared that the agency's test is an empty thing ... [and is considered]
'almost a fiction' to say that an employer could ever meet the [B]oard's
reasonable good faith doubt standard." Id.
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employer polling and the imposition of mandatory annual polls
conducted by unions.
I.

EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

Federal government investigations into unfair labor practices
shortly after World War I eventually led Congress to pass a series
of Acts designed to protect the American worker. The first Act
came during the height of the Great Depression when Congress
passed the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA).
Congress passed the Act in response to industry trends of cutting
wages and laying-off senior employees. The Act, however, would
last only two short years before the United States Supreme Court
struck it down as unconstitutional, forcing Congress back to the
drawing board. Congress then enacted the Wagner Act, allowing
employees to, among other things, freely organize and join unions.
And in 1947, Congress extended the Wagner Act's protections from
unfair labor practices by passing the Taft-Hartley Act
amendments, which included protection from union unfair labor
practices.
Section A analyzes the NIRA, its immediate effects, and its
ultimate demise at the hands of the Supreme Court. Sections B
and C examine the Wanger and the Taft-Hartley Acts respectively,
focusing on the union protections Congress afforded employees.
Finally, Section D describes the procedures required for a union to
be recognized by an employer as the bargaining representative of a
majority of its employees, and the evidence an employer may show
to refute the union's majority status.
A.

The NationalIndustrialRecovery Act's Failure

The Great Depression of 1929 radically changed the worker's
perspective in the United States." The heavy costs to industry
caused by the Depression motivated many large companies to
renounce the "welfare capitalism" approach of the 1920s and to lay
off senior employees and cut wages.11 In response, President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt embarked on an aspiring tentative plan

10. IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY
14-15 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1950). The national income plunged from eighty-one
billion dollars in 1929 to forty-nine billion dollars in 1932, with earnings
carrying most of the losses. Id. There were over fifteen million unemployed in
1933. Id.
11. SANFORD M. JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY: MANAGERS, UNIONS,
AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF WORK IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1900-1945
219-21 (Columbia Univ. Press 1985). Many companies tried to forestall wage
reductions for a time but, in the fall of 1931 U.S. Steel cut its wages, and the
automobile, textile, and rubber tire industries quickly agreed to do the same.
Id. at 217.
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called the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.12
Many saw the NIRA as a way to bring the economic cataclysm
of the Great Depression to a close and provide protection to the
workers from abusive employers. 3 Soon after its enactment there
was an explosion of organizing and strikes as workers felt a

feigned perception of strength. Among the upheaval were fierce
strikes occurring in 1934 among automobile parts workers in
Toledo, longshoremen in San Francisco, and truckers in
Minneapolis. 4 Such violence continued because unions, lacking
faith in the labor board's ability to resolve labor disputes, favored
Furthermore, many
an immediate response by striking.'
employers persisted that they would only bargain with in-house
employee representation plans, even where the autonomous union
held the majority support of the employees."6
Eventually, on May 27, 1935, the Supreme Court struck down
the NIRA as an unconstitutional commission of legislative
authority in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.'7 The
12. Id. at 223.
Companies were to coordinate themselves, eradicate
cut-throat rivalry and secure costs in order to increase buying power and
decrease unemployment, which included the founding of the minimum wage
and maximum hours criterion in every industry. Id.
13. Id. at 223-24.
See also IRVING BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS: A
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WORKER 1933-1941 40-41 (Houghton Miffin Co.
1969) (1970) (discussing the growth of the United Mine Workers); JAMES A.
GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN
ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND THE LAW, VOL. 1 (1933-1937) 62 (Univ. of New
York Press 1974) (chronicling violent strikes in the 1930s).
14. GROSS, supra note 13, at 62. See generally BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT
YEARS, supra note 13, at 40-41.
See also
15. BERNSTEIN, TURBULENT YEARS, supra note 13, at 217.
BERNSTEIN, NEW DEAL, supra note 10, at 86 (explaining that unions were
correct in their fear because the Labor Board had no enforcement authority
was unable to provide any form of assistance regarding dispute resolution).
16. See, e.g., Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir.
1943) (stating in-house employee representation plans were set up by
employers as a means of warding off organization drives).
17. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). The facts of the case involved a company whose
business dealt with "wholesale poultry slaughterhouse markets in Brooklyn,
New York." Id. at 520. The company purchased poultry and sent it to
slaughterhouses and shortly afterwards, the poultry was resold to retail
poultry merchants and meat dealers, who then sold it to the public. Id. at 521.
The company never sold poultry in interstate commerce. Id. The petitioners
argued that, among other allegations, the company violated the requirements
regarding minimum wages and maximum hours of labor. Id. at 520. The
Supreme Court held that the NIRA, which was to regulate wages and hours,
was not within the congressional power of regulation and therefore, an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Id. at 541. "[Plrovisions ...
to fix the hours and wages of employees of [the company] in their interstate
business was not a valid exercise of federal power." Id. at 550. Furthermore,
since the company was not involved in interstate commerce, the Congress had
no authority to intervene. Id. at 543.
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NIRA's demise led the way for new labor relations legislation,
called the National Labor Relations Act (Labor Relations Act or
Wagner Act),18 championed by Senator Robert F. Wagner of New
York, an organized labor supporter."
B. Legislative History of the Wagner Act
The Wagner Act's centerpiece was section 7, which provided
various employee protections. 0 As a means of giving content to
section 7 rights, the Wagner Act specified certain unfair employer
labor practices.2 ' Nevertheless, believing that the Wagner Act
exceeded Congress' legislative authority, many companies
continued to resist the new law22 until the Supreme Court upheld
its constitutionality in 1937.23 Although one of the primary policy

18. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
19. Kenneth M. Casebeer, Holder of the Pen: An Interview with Leon
Keyserling on Drafting the Wagner Act, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285, 296 (1987).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000). This section provides that:
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
through
collectively
to bargain
labor
organizations,
assist
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment.

Id.
21. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2000). Employer unfair labor practices include: Section
8(a)(1) of the Act, which states that "[iut shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer ... to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2000).
Section 8(a)(2) states that "[iut shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer.., to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
29
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it ....
U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2000). Section 8(a)(3), which states in relevant part: "It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2000). Section 8(a)(4) notes that "[i]t
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given
testimony under this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2000). Section 8(a)(5)
declares that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... to
refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ......
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2000).
22. Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the
Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 266
(1978). See also GROSS, supra note 13, at 89-103 (explaining that the NIRA
experience presented the necessity for an effective and forceful administrative
agency with enforcement authority [which the Wagner Act provided], rather
than a bureau whose main purpose was to assist in regulating disputes).
23. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The case
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reasons for the Wagner Act 24 was to deter industrial conflict, some
academics denounced the Act for outlawing the kind of labor
activity they theorized was necessary to reconstruct society during
the 1930s.25
After World War II, a swell of lengthy and persistent strikes
overwhelmed many key industries and aroused extensive public
support for suppressing the power and alleged abuses of organized
labor.26 Moreover, there was a need to provide a balance of power

involved an employer who was the fourth largest steel producer in the United
States, and operated mines and quarries. Id. at 26. The employer produced
raw materials in many states, and transported those materials in interstate
commerce. Id. The employer discharged certain employees for engaging in
union activities in violation of the Wagner Act. Id. at 22. The employer
argued the Act was unconstitutional because it attempted to regulate labor
relations between employers and employees, a subject matter outside the
scope of Congress' commerce clause power. Id. at 25. The Supreme Court
rejected that argument and held that the Wagner Act was constitutional. Id.
at 47. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress can regulate internal affairs of
an employer, such as the discharge of an employee, where the business affects
interstate commerce. Id. at 31. Because the employer's vast transportation
system constituted interstate commerce, any strike, lockout, or disruption of
peaceful relations between employer and its employees was bound to affect
interstate commerce. Id. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that steel
strikes had not only affected interstate commerce, but they also had a
devastating effect on the economy. Id. at 43.
24. Section 1 of the Act discusses "[t]he inequality of bargaining power
between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other
forms of business association," and how this "affects the flow of commerce" as
well as the discouraging consequence such disparity has had on "wage rates
and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry ....
29 U.S.C. § 151
(2000). Lloyd Ulman, Why Should Human Resources Managers Pay High
Wages?, 30 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 177, 205 (1992). As Ulman noticed, "[tihe
union organization was in part a response to the breaking of many implicit
contracts, after early attempts by employers to hold limits on wages, [and] to
stabilize employment..." and such "breaking of implicit contracts (albeit
under duress) generated worker demands ... for organizations that could
negotiate and enforce them." Id.
25. See Klare, supra note 22, at 266 (explaining that the Wagner Act
destroyed the unions chance to develop their own criteria for protecting labor
rights). But see GROSS, supra note 13, at 89-103 (stating that one of the
reasons the NIRA was ineffective (besides being unconstitutional) was due to
the need for a powerful agency that possessed enforcement authority to
resolve disputes, which was provided by the Wagner Act). Furthermore, such a
radical approach, which looks upon the power of violence to achieve
cooperation between employer and employee creates only hostility and
resentment and thus, cannot rationally be seen as enhancing a successful
working relationship. Id.
26. See Daniel J.B. Mitchell, Inflation, Unemployment and the Wagner Act:
A Critical Reappraisal,38 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (1986) (asserting that the
subject-matter concerning the strike was substantially more serious than the
industrial concept of consolidated negotiations).

2003]

Overhauling the Good Faith Reasonable Doubt Test

between unions and the rights of employers and employees.27 Such
union power (and abuse of power) contributed to the enactment of
the Taft-Hartley amendments and the Labor-Management
Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act or the LMRA). 8
C. Taft-Hartley Act Incorporatedwith the Wagner Act
In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act amended the Wagner Act to
protect employees from union abuses.2 9 The objective of the
amendments was to compensate for certain preferences granted to
unions under the Wagner Act by compelling analogous obligations
on unions."° The preliminary Hartley bill would have prohibited
economic negotiations, rationalizing that such bargaining would
cause a financial crisis because it increased income expenses."
However, Senator Taft was more deliberate than Congressman
Hartley in the House of Representatives, and therefore, Taft,
wanting to preserve the wage-buying authority of the Wagner Act,
was unwilling to prohibit economic negotiations. 2 However, these
debates, as well as a veto attempt by President Truman, would not
prevent the Act's passage."
In addition to protections from union abuses, the Taft-Hartley
Act gives employees tremendous control over choosing their union
representatives. Most importantly, the Act authorizes employees
to: 1) petition the National Labor Relations Board ("Labor Board")
for union elections to select a majority representative,34 and 2)
27. See PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 39-40 (1992)
(describing how unions accumulated enormous power with no method
available in supplying a review or inspection on such intensity and expansion).
28. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-187 (2000).
29. The Taft-Hartley Act prohibits unions from "restrain[ing] or coerc[ing]"
employees while exercising their statutorily protected rights. 29 U.S.C. §158

(b)(1)(A) (2000).

It is the union's obligation under this section to provide

representation to all employees in the bargaining unit equitably and
impartially. Section 8(b)(1)(B) explains that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor
practice for a [union] ... to restrain or coerce ... an employer in the selection
of [its] representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the
adjustment of grievances." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(B) (2000). Section 8(b)(2)
asserts that "[iut shall be an unfair labor practice for a [union] ... to cause or
attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee .... 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (2000). Section 8(b)(3) states that "[i]t shall be an unfair
labor practice for a [union] ... to refuse to bargain collectively with an
employer .... 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (2000). Sections 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) place
limitations on union picketing and boycotts. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) and 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (2000).
30. HARDIN, supra note 27, at 39-40.
31. H.R. REP. NO. 80-245 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 33 (1948).
32. Id. at 1649.
33. Id.
34. Section 9(c)(1)(B) permits an employer to file a representation petition
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Petition the Labor Board for election to de-certify a union as a
majority representative. 5
The Act also permits unions, seeking recognition as the
bargaining representative for a majority of an employer's
employees, to file a petition with the Labor Board requesting
representation elections.36 The union can seek such elections when
an employer fails to acknowledge it as the employees' bargaining
delegate,37 or when the employer has recognized it as the
bargaining
representative,
but wishes
to be legally
acknowledged.38
Whether filed by a union or an employee, a petition must
illustrate that thirty percent of the employees endorse a
representation election. 0 In an election, the union prevails if it has
acquired over fifty percent of the authentic votes cast. The Labor
Board then produces a certificate of representation appointing the
union as the employees' exclusive bargaining representative. 0
Following a union's certification, the union holds an irrebuttable
presumption of majority support for one year.4" Once certified,

when an exclusive agent seeks recognition. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (2000);
United States Gypsum Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 964, 966 n.4 (1950).
35. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-67, 171-81 (2000). Under the Taft-Hartley Act,
section 9(c)(1)(A)(ii) was amended to uphold employees' right to petition for
decertification elections. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c)(1)(A) (2000). See also Steven E.
Abraham, How the Taft-Hartley Act Hindered Unions, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1,
29 (1994) (explaining that under the NLRA, decertification elections by
employees were not allowed and therefore, the sole manner a union who had
been certified could be forced to relinquish its privilege to act as representative
and protector of the employees was if another union had concrete and tangible
support of the employees).
36. Section 9(c)(1) provides for an official inquiry to be submitted in order to
ascertain if a majority of employees want to be represented by a specific union.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)-(3) (2000).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (c)(1)(B) (2000).
39. NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 101.18(a)(4) (2002).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B)(3) (2000); NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29
C.F.R. § 102.69(b) (2002). See also ROBERT GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAW 40 (1976) (writing that a union may be chosen the bargaining delegate by
the free-will of the employer or by a Labor Board directed election complying
with conditions set forth in section 9 of the Labor Relations Act).
41. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 99-100 (1954). The Court reasoned that
such a requirement encourages unity in bargaining associations, strengthens
the gravity of the election procedure, grants the union a gauge to accomplish
its commission without an urgency thereby resulting in rapid and careless
decisions, assures good-faith bargaining by the employer, and decreases
industrial conflict. Id. Additionally, the Court specified exceptions to the rule
that extends a year-long presumption of majority support to a certified union
including; if the certified union has disintegrated or become obsolete; as a
result of division, essentially all of the members of a certified union have
shifted their alliance to a different union; or the size of the bargaining unit has
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employees can terminate the bargaining relationship by filing a
decertification petition, indicating that at least thirty percent of
the employees in a bargaining unit want an election to decide the
current standing of their bargaining representative."
The Labor Board also permits employers to contest an
incumbent union's majority status when the employer has an
objectively reasonable doubt as to the union's majority position.
Evidence such as swift reductions in union checkoffs;43 union
immobility, such as neglecting to take affirmative action regarding
employee complaints;" and employee assertions of discontent can
all give rise to an employer's reasonable doubt as to a union's
majority status.45 Once an employer has a reasonable doubt about
a union's majority status the employer can pursue one of three
options: 1) the employer may revoke its recognition of the union; 2)
the employer may petition the Labor Board for a decertification
election; 6 or 3)
the employer can poll its employees to measure
47
union support.
Historically, the Labor Board applied the same reasonable
doubt standard regardless of which option an employer chose to
pursue.4" However, the Supreme Court's decision in Allentown
had significant and continuous oscillation within a short period of time. Id. at
98-99.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000); NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29
C.F.R. § 101.18 (2002).
43. See GORMAN, supra note 40, at 670-71 (explaining that a dues checkoff
is a freely approved deduction by the employer of union contribution from the
earnings of a union member, which is comparable to a reduction for taxes or
insurance and thus, the employer pays the sum deducted to the union).
44. Star Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 536 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1976). The employer
failed to comply with a provision in the union/employer contract which
dictated that overtime be divided uniformly among employees. Id. at 1194.
Nevertheless, the union never filed a grievance opposing the employer because
the union negligently failed to designate a union steward to dispense with
such matters. Id.
45. Thomas A. Seger, The Majority Status of Incumbent Bargaining
Representatives, 47 TUL. L. REV. 961, 992 (1973). Other implications of loss of
support involve: the registration of a representation petition by an external
union; employee turnover; the union's perimeter of success in the certification
election and other numerous forms of evidence used by employers to
demonstrate union loss of support. Id. at 990-96.
46. 29 U.S.C. 159(c)(1)(B) (2000).
47. Struksnes Constr. Co., Inc. and Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local
No. 49, AFL-CIO, 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967). An employer polling of its
employees violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless the employer assures its
employees they will not suffer retaliation, the poll is conducted by secret
ballot, and the employer does not engage in any unfair labor practices. Id. at
1063.
48. See Montgomery Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. at 724 (1974) (holding that a
poll, taken by the employer to ascertain union status, is not appropriate when
there is no basis for doubting majority support).
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Mack Sales & Services, Inc. v. NLRB brings into question whether
reasonable doubt has the same meaning when applied to employee
polling as it does when an employer withdraws union recognition
or requests representation elections.49 Under that opinion, while
an employee must still demonstrate reasonable doubt before
polling its employees, the Court seemingly applied a less stringent
standard than necessary to justify withdrawing union recognition
or requesting elections." Thus, although employers have rarely
resorted to employee polling in recent history, employers may soon
begin exercising this option more frequently when challenging an
incumbent union.
II.

ANALYZING EMPLOYER AND UNION POLLING: THE EXISTING
DOUBLE STANDARD

The Court recognized in Allentown Mack that it is an
extremely arduous task for employers to demonstrate that a union
no longer has majority support among its employees. 1 Section A of
Part II begins with an in-depth inquiry into the Court's decision,
its repercussions, and the implications for future employer polling
disputes. Section B discusses the Labor Board's response to the
Supreme Court's ruling, illustrating the unfair benefits the Board
affords unions over employers and its negative impacts. Section C
illustrates the considerable hardship employees face when they
seek to terminate union representation by voluntarily filing a
decertification petition. In particular, section C chronicles the
harassment and violence union members inflict on union
employees who resign from the union. Section C further explains
that judicial challenges to union status and labor disputes harm
all parties involved including the employer, union, and employee.
Finally, section C addresses the necessity for employee
participation regarding the enforcement of their union rights.
A. Supreme Court Analyzes Employer Polling
In Allentown Mack, seven of Allentown Mack's thirty-two
employees told company executives that they no longer supported
their union, the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers." To test support for the union among its

49. Allentown Mack Sales & Srv., Inc. v. NLRB, 118 S. Ct. 818, 822-24
(1998).
50. Id.
51. Curtis H. Allen III, Note, Judicial Review Gone Awry: The Supreme
Court Rewrites the NLRB's Unitary Standard in Allentown Mack Sales &
Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1925, 1927 (June 1999).
52. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 83 F.3d 1483, 1487 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
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employees, Allentown Mack conducted a poll by secret ballot 3
Workers voted nineteen to thirteen against continued union
representation. 54
In response, the company withdrew its
recognition of the union."
The Labor Board ruled that Allentown Mack's actions
violated the Labor Relations Act because the company did not
have a sufficient basis to doubt the union's majority status before
conducting the poll. 6 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the Labor Board's decision, adhering to the Board's
reasonable doubt evidentiary standard.57
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Allentown Mack argued
that because the Labor Board required the same reasonable doubt
standard for employee polling as it did for withdrawing union
recognition, the Labor Board had rendered polling allowable only
when it was formally senseless to conduct such a poll. 8 Justice
53. Id. at 1484. The circuit court summarized that only seven of Allentown
Mack's thirty-two employees in the bargaining unit had made declarations
prior to the poll rejecting union representation. Id. at 1487. That number,
according to the Labor Board, was "far short of the number needed to raise
doubts about the union's majority support." Id. Allentown Mack argued that
the Labor Board also had been mistaken in disregarding several employees
from the number of employees disapproving the union. Id. The Labor Board
discounted three employees by reasoning that they were not members of the
bargaining unit on the day Allentown Mack made known to the union by letter
that it would cease recognizing the union and would direct a poll. Id. The
Labor Board also had disregarded statements made by employees during job
interviews, as well as unconfirmed reports of employee discontent with the
union. Id. at 1487-88. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the
Labor Board that the agency was not required to consider those anti-union
sentiments in determining whether Allentown Mack had sufficient evidence of
the union's loss of majority support to conduct a poll. Id. at 1488. But see
Struksnes Constr. Co., Inc. and Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local No. 49,
AFL-CIO, 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063 (1967) (showing that the employer must
comply with five essential criteria to be allowed to poll employees, and no
criteria mentioned a specific percentage of employee anti-union statements
that must be met to be considered reasonable doubt by the employer).
54. Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1485.
55. Id.
56. Id. The Labor Board contended that an employer, who without
adequate indication of a union's loss of majority support, directed a poll and
thereafter declined to recognize that union breached section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5)
of the Act. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1)-(5) (2000).
57. Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1487.
58. Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 819-20. The Court further asserted that
the standard for polling should be less severe than for an employer who
desires to withdraw recognition because there were several reasons why an

employer might request a poll of its employees. Id. Instead, the Labor Board
imposed a greater evidentiary standard, which is "puzzling" for "the [Labor]
Board irrationally permits employers to poll only when it would be
unnecessary and legally pointless to do so." Id. See also Allentown Mack, 83
F.3d at 1486 (admitting that the Labor Board's approach of requiring
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Scalia, writing for the majority, acknowledged the Labor "Board's
adoption of a unitary standard for polling, RM elections, and
withdrawals of recognition is in some respects a puzzling policy," 9
but deferred to the Labor Board because the standard
was
"rational and consistent with the [Labor Relations] Act." 60
However, despite the Court's seeming adherence to the Labor
Board's reasonable doubt standard,61 the majority questioned the
Labor Board's definition of "doubt." The Court found that the
Labor Board interpreted "doubt" in polling cases as "disbelief,"
which it found too harsh." Instead, the Court concluded that it
was good enough that an employer be "uncertain about.., the
union's retention of majority support" before conducting an
employee poll.63 Thus, while the Court affirmed the Labor Board's
reasonable doubt standard, it reduced the employer's evidentiary
burden.4
In one part of its opinion, the Court seemingly agreed with
the Labor Board's view that employer polling is "potentially
disruptive to establishing bargaining relationships and unsettling
to employees," insisting that "polling should be tolerated only
when the employer might otherwise simply withdraw recognition
and refuse to bargain."
However, in the second part of its
opinion, the Court stated, "[gyiving fair weight to Allentown's
circumstantial evidence," a jury could conclude that Allentown
Mack had a rational and credible foundation to disbelieve that the
union possessed majority support by the employees. 66 Justice
Scalia stated that an employer may use "unsubstantiated
assertions" by employees to establish its good faith reasonable

employers to meet the same evidentiary burden for polling as for a simple
withdrawal of recognition made polling only slightly worthwhile).
59. Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 822.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 823.

62. Id.

The Court emphasized that "'[dloubt' is precisely that sort of

'disbelief (failure to believe) which consists of an uncertainty rather than a
belief in the opposite." Id. Thus, the Court stressed that "[a] doubt is an
uncertain, tentative, or provisional disbelief." Id.

63. Id. at 825.
64. Id. at 822.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 825. The Supreme Court harshly criticized the Labor Board for
disregarding various statements made by employee, which "would cause
anyone to doubt that degree of support." Id. at 819. The high Court further
admonished the Labor Board and the Administrative Law Judge for failing to
explain the types of "evidence that [the employer] should have weighed on the
other side" and that the Labor Board cannot slyly alter its speculation of
continuing majority support into a working postulation that all of a union's
employees support the union until confirmed differently. Id.
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doubt for the union's majority support.67 After the Court's ruling in
Allentown Mack, an employer simply needs to show that it is
unsure about the union's majority status, rather than producing
sufficient evidence to disbelieve the union's majority status."
B. The Labor Board's ProposedRules Gives Unions an Unfair
Edge
Shortly after the Court's decision in Allentown Mack, the
Labor Board responded by giving notice it was considering
modifying its regulations so that an employer could only revoke
union recognition after a Labor Board sponsored decertification
election. 69
The Labor Board's proposed modifications would
prevent employers from both polling its employees and
unilaterally withdrawing its union recognition even if it has
reasonable doubt of the union's majority status.0 The Labor Board
also stressed that it was considering whether to structure any new
standard retroactively, making the rule applicable to pending
71
cases.
These modifications could create considerable dangers for
employers seeking to challenge union representation by a method
other than petitioning the Labor Board for representative
elections. For instance, employers who conduct employee polling
may perpetuate an unfair labor practice despite their strict
compliance with the Court's ruling in Allentown Mack.72
At the same time, under the proposed modifications, certified
unions still enjoy a presumption of majority status, even if the
union admits lacking employee membership.73 Moreover, even if a

67. Id. at 824. The Court stated that uncorroborated statements by
employees do not, by themselves, demonstrate disapproval of the union. Id.

Yet, the point is not the dissatisfaction, since that is the purpose of the poll,

but rather, the question is whether a reasonable uncertainty exists regarding
lack of union majority status. Id.

68. Id. at 821.
69. Chelsea Indus., Inc. and Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric.
Implement Workers of Am. (UAW), AFL-CIO, 165 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1118 n.2

(2000).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Allen, supra note 51, at 1927.
73. See NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 307 n.62 (9th Cir. 1978)
(holding that the union's admissions to lack of membership were not damaging
to the union's position because the admissions concerned only membership
and not union support).
However, the contradiction is that employee
membership would determine union support. The possible interpretation to
the controversy is that if employees are content - even with low union
membership - it is presumed that the union is supported. This interpretation
is analogous to government and low voter turnout. If voter turnout is low, it is
assumed that people are relatively content, for if they were not satisfied, they
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union uses illegal tactics or engages in activity unprotected by the
Labor Relations Act, the union will not be bargaining in bad
faith.74
Thus, notwithstanding the current double standard
governing union and employer good faith bargaining," the Labor
Board seeks to impose more restrictions on employers, creating a
greater unfair advantage for unions.
C. Challenging the Union's Status by Employer and Employee
Another disturbing labor
policy involves
employee
decertification. The Taft-Hartley Act permits employees who are
no longer satisfied with union representation to file a
decertification petition with the Labor Board.77 In contrast to the
employer's high burden of proof when challenging an incumbent
union's status, employees must satisfy a much less strict burden of
proof.78 The Act simply requires at least thirty percent of the
employees in a bargaining unit to sign the petition in order to force

elections to determine the union's status.79
Critics of the Taft-Hartley Act contend that permitting
employees to file a decertification petition hinders unions."0
However, employee decertification is not always a feasible choice."
First, employees challenging union status must assemble the

would vote for reforms.
74. See NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 492-96 (1960)
(stating that the use of economic coercion by the union as well as other union
activity, even if it is illegal or unprotected by the Act, is not viewed as
bargaining in bad faith).
75. Id. See also Cheney Cal. Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 319 F.2d 375, 378-80
(9th Cir. 1963) (explaining that a union strike during negotiations while a
contract is in effect in violation of a no-strike clause, does not indicate that the
union has bargained in bad faith).
76. See Allen, supra note 51, at 1947-48.
77. Section 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act grants employees' the right to pursue
a decertification election. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000). See also NLRB v.
Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571, 578 (9th Cir. 1980) (reasoning that
employees who are discontent with their representative have other remedies
at their control).
78. Pioneer Inn Assoc. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 1978). The
court stressed that the Labor Board may look more favorably upon the union
when the union's position is confronted by the employer rather than by the
employees. Id. See also Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486,
491 (2d Cir. 1975) (stating that if an employer ceases to bargain, justification
requires a high standard of proof for such actions).
79. See generally J. FEERICK, ET AL., NLRB REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS LAW, PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 83-115, 236-47 (1980) (explaining Labor Board

presumptions, election procedures, and voting procedures).
80. Abraham, supra note 35, at 29.
81. Joel B. Toomey, Comment, Application of the Good-Faith-DoubtTest to
the Presumption of Continued Majority Status of Incumbent Unions, 1981
DUKE L.J. 718, 730 (1981).
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requisite thirty percent to endorse the petition.82 Second, most
employees are unaware of the statutory requirements for filing a
decertification petition.83
Finally, even if the employees
understand the procedure in filing a decertification petition,
employees may not want to anger the union, fearing retribution.84
To be sure, most employees do not understand that only by
enrolling as union members are they bound by the union's rules
and policies.8" In fact, employees often mistakenly presume union
membership is a mandatory prerequisite for employment.88 Thus,
most employees are unaware that they cannot be compelled to
become or continue as a member of a union as a requirement of
employment.87
It may be argued that if an individual is dissatisfied with the
union he may simply resign.88 An employee has the right to
renounce his affiliation with the union and dissolve this
relationship, thereby avoiding union fines and discipline. 9
However, resignation may expose the employee and his or her

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Rossie D. Alston, Jr. & Glenn M. Taubman, Union Discipline and
Employee Rights, at http://www.nrtworg.RDA.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
An overwhelming number of employees do not comprehend that a union's
rules usually supply unions with the power to penalize members by
discharging fees against employees who do not "toe the union line." Id. Also,
unions have the authority to file suit against those same employees to obtain
the prescribed penalty fees. Id.
85. See Wegscheid v. Local Union 2911, 117 F.3d 986, 990 (7th Cir. 1997)
(declaring that employees were plainly informed that complete union
membership and the expense of full union dues was ordered as a prerequisite
of employment).
86. Buzenius v. NLRB, 124 F.3d 788, 792 (6th Cir. 1997). The union
erroneously told employees that they were required to participate as full union
members, including payment of union dues, in order to remain employed. Id.
87. But see C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE
INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 202-20 (1962) (explaining that according to

Canadian tradition, individual workers are relatively powerless in their
dealings with individual employers, so they combine with fellow workers in
order to gain a competitive advantage). See also DAVID M. BEATTY, PUTTING
THE CHARTER TO WORK 116-32 (1987) (stating that labor unions in Canada
claim complete authority regarding the right to work, to withhold that work,
or otherwise, to dispose of the "property" rights that are derived from the
personal industry of each individual member of those unions).
88. V Pattern Makers' v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 115 (1985). The Court held
that employees have the prerogative to resign from a union during any period,
and that union rules barring resignations are unlawful. Id. In International
Bd. of Boilermakers v. Local Lodge D129, 910 F.2d 1056, 1060 (2d Cir. 1990),
the court stated that each employee is granted "the right to refrain from any
or all" activities. Thus, the court affirmed that each employee has the right to
resign from union membership at any time. Id.
89. PatternMakers', 473 U.S. at 115.
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family to harassment and violence by other union members."°
Therefore, resignation is not a viable option. At the same time, an
employer will not be apprehensive in contesting the union's status
and, unlike the employee, possesses the requisite information in
filing a petition. 91
Furthermore, there can be vital time delays in litigation when
a decision of the Labor Board is challenged in the courts.92 This
suspension has fatalistic implications for the union and the
employees. 93 During this time, the union cannot represent its
employees because the employer refuses to bargain.94 Union
members may become discouraged with the union's ineptitude and
their inability to do anything on the employees' behalf9
Additionally, newly hired employees may not support the union
with the same intensity as longtime employees who have had the
benefit of prior and continuous union representation.99
Moreover, in order for any regulatory plan regarding polling
to operate effectively, the employees must know their rights. If
there is to be meaningful participation between employer and
employee, there is a significant and separate benefit in having the
employees themselves be involved in an important capacity in
order to initiate, supervise, and enforce their rights in the
90. See Your Legal Rights: Railway or Airline Employee, at
http://www.nrtw.org/a/a 7_r.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2003) (listing
recommendations for employees seeking protection from harassment and
violence upon resignation during a union strike). These guidelines are as
follows:
Whatever your decision with regard to resigning and working during the
strike, you should keep as low a profile as possible and attempt to
maintain existing cordial relationships with your fellow workers on both
sides of the picket line. Avoid the zealots! Should you return to work,
keep in close touch with other employees who are working during the
strike and give each other support and share information. Also, if you
work during the strike, you should get an unlisted telephone number,
keep a diary of all strike-related threats and incidents of harassment
and violence (who, where, what, when, names of witnesses, etc.), and
take photographs of your private property, such as home and car, so that
you can document any damage should you become a victim of union
violence. If you begin to receive harassing phone calls, you should
consider installing Caller-ID on your home phone. You should report all
threats and incidents of harassment and violence to your employer and,
if threats of actual violence are involved, the local police.
Id.
91. Toomey, supra note 81, at 730.
92. See generally NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775
(1990) (providing an eleven year time delay).
93. Douglas E. Ray, Withdrawal of Recognition after Curtin Matheson: A
House Built upon Sand, 25 U.S.F. L. REV. 265, 280-81 (1991).
94. Id. at 281-82.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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workplace.
Surprisingly, informed employees who file
decertification petitions and succeed in eliminating union
representation are boosting the economy.97 However, realistically,
employees probably desire representation because they do not
want the burden of dealing with detailed policies and labor
procedures. Therefore, the next best alternative is a system which
implements a mandatory yearly employee poll.
III.

UNIFORM SYSTEM ELIMINATES DOUBLE STANDARD

A uniform system of mandatory annual employee polls would
redress many of the above-mentioned concerns. Section A of Part
III discusses why employer polling, in contrast to employee
polling, is the preferable approach for determining union status.
Section B proposes a mandatory annual union poll. Section B
further illustrates how a mandatory annual poll would eliminate
the good faith bargaining requirement currently posed on
employers thus establishing an impartial system for determining
union majority status.
A.

Employer Polls Protect Employees

Because employers know the process for challenging union
status and are less likely to fear union reprisals, employers are
better equipped to challenge union majority status than
uninformed employees who face union retaliation.98 A consistent
practice regarding union and employer polling would ultimately
benefit the employees, or at the very least, discover if a majority of
employees continue to support the union.
Employer polling is a protective measure for the employees.
A union claims to protect all employees, requiring only a majority
of employee support for its establishment.99 If employees no longer
support the union, for whatever reason, and the employer is aware
of this lack of support, the law should not burden employers with
strict and severe guidelines for polling its employees.
97. Stephen G. Bronars & Donald R. Deere, Union Representation Elections
and Firm Profitability, 29 INDUS. REL. 15-17 (Winter 1990).
Data was
provided which demonstrates that successful employee decertification
petitions increase shareholder wealth, while failed employee decertification
petitions decrease shareholder wealth. Id. See also Steven E. Abraham, The
Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Balance of Power in Industrial Relations,
33 AM. BUS. L.J. 341, 343 (Spring 1996) (noting decline in earnings due to
unionism and circumstances identified with unions is immense when the
strength of unions is prominent). It is union domination that is the origin of
their capability to influence the occurrences that have been demonstrated to
diminish business revenues. Id.
98. Toomey, supra note 81, at 730.
99. A union triumphs in an election if it obtains a majority (over fifty
percent) of the verified votes cast. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2000).
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The Labor Board should not expect the employer to show
evidence that a majority of employees are dissatisfied with the
union."° After all, the purpose of the poll is to determine if the
union does in fact retain a majority of member support. 10
Lessening the strict guidelines of employer polling not only assists
the employer in determining if employees still support the union,
but also allows employees to seek other representation if they so
prefer.
Admittedly, such a polling system may not be feasible because
of the Labor Board's broad discretion, which is reflected in its
inconsistent rulings.0 2 The Labor Board's contradictory and
whimsical tactics generate serious drawbacks for all parties
involved. An employer is compelled to demonstrate that the union
does not have majority support, which is a very difficult feat.0 3
Also, in trying to accumulate evidence, an employer is in danger of
Employers who ask
committing an unfair labor practice.
employees about union attitudes may violate section 8(a)(1) of the
Labor Relations Act, which forbids an employer from pressuring
employees in the performance of their privileges under the Labor
Relations Act." 4
On the other hand, a union has the advantage over the
The law permits unions to
employer in polling its employees.'

100. See Curtin Matheson Sci., 494 U.S. at 799-800 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing that the Labor Board seems to demand that good
faith reasonable doubt be proved by explicit declarations of specific
employees). See also Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1487 (stating that only seven
of Allentown Mack's thirty-two employees in the bargaining unit had made
assertions prior to the poll rejecting union representation and that number,
according to the Labor Board, was not enough to foster doubts about the
union's majority status).
101. See Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 836 (stating that the employer's
burden is not to prove overwhelming union dissatisfaction, since that is the
reason for polling, instead the employer's burden is to show whether a
reasonable uncertainty exists regarding lack of union majority status).
102. See Allentown Mack, 83 F.3d at 1488 (agreeing with the Labor Board
that only seven of Allentown Mack's thirty-two employees in the bargaining
unit had told the employer before the poll was held that they no longer favored
the union). Cf. Curtin Matheson, 494 U.S. at 797 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
(emphasizing that some Labor Board results order an employer to only
disclose that employees have notified their wish to reject union representation
to prove the employer's good faith reasonable doubt).
103. Joan Flynn, A Triple Standard at the NLRB: Employer Challenges to an
Incumbent Union, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 653, 678-80; Toomey, supra note 81, at
723.
104. See Struksnes Constr. Co., Inc. and Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs,
Local No. 49, AFL-CIO, 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063 (1967) (stating that an
employer will violate section 8(a)(1) of the Labor Relations Act unless the
employer complies with five elements required to poll its employees).
105. Toomey, supra note 81, at 736.
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conduct inquiries of employees without violating the employees'
independent preference of union management."' Although a union
has some power over the employees, they cannot terminate the
employees, while the employer can."'
B. Imposing Mandatory Union Polls
A mandatory poll conducted annually by the union would
provide an impartial and unbiased system, which would eradicate
the unclear good faith reasonable doubt test. Furthermore,
regulating union polling would compel unions to continue vigorous
and competent representation of its members as well as abolish
the double standard that currently exists regarding union and
employee polling." 8 The proposed annual union poll would be
regulated by an independent entity. If that annual poll should
reveal that at least thirty percent of the employees in the
bargaining unit no longer wish to be represented by the union, an
election would be conducted. °9 If more than fifty percent of the
votes cast reveal that the employees no longer want union
representation, the union's position as the bargaining
representative would be revoked."0
CONCLUSION
Within
unionized
employment,
a
cultural
climate
emphasizing democratic values must be created. To foster such a
climate, union employees must be committed to supplanting the
current national labor system with one that promotes equality and
protects the employees' freedom to choose, or not to choose, union
representation.
The current system severely restricts employers' rights to poll
their employees, even if employees express their dissatisfaction
with the union. As a result, this system frequently suppresses the
employees' true desires.
The history of labor procedures
illustrates the problems that exist including contradictory
decisions by the Labor Board, perplexity over the burden of
proof,"' and profound disadvantages to employers and employees.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Pioneer Inn Assoc. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 1978)
(determining that the Labor Board may view the union more favorably when
challenged by the employer, rather than the employees).
109. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000) (setting out employee
decertification procedures).

110. Id.
111. See Allentown Mack, 118 S. Ct. at 829 (approving the Labor Board's
procedure in permitting polling in cases where the employer exhibits good
faith reasonable doubt, but decreasing the evidentiary criterion which
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The ultimate solution to these problems is for the Labor
Board to treat unions and employers equally. Because this is quite
unlikely, the best approach is for the Labor Board to impose a
mandatory poll, 112 conducted annually by the union, to determine if
the union still enjoys majority status. Such a procedure would
abolish the good faith reasonable doubt test, and all the biases
that are included in this test. Employee rights are best guarded
by the election procedure, and protection of employee rights was
the basis for the original establishment of the National Labor
Relations Act." 3

instructs the employer to demonstrate that doubt).
112. The Labor Relations Act provides the Labor Board with the power to
"make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative
Procedure Act, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).
113. The Labor Management Relations Act provides that:
[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist
labor organizations,
to bargain
collectively
through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2000).

